A Principal appoints a committee of partially informed experts to choose a policy. The experts' preferences are aligned with each other but conflict with hers. We study whether she gains from banning committee members from communicating or "deliberating" before voting. Our main result is that if the committee plays its preferred equilibrium and the Principal uses a threshold voting rule, then she does not gain from banning deliberation.
Introduction
A Dean is considering whether to offer a recruiting slot to the economics department. She would like to hire good professors, not hire bad ones, and incurs a particular configuration of costs from making type 1 and type 2 errors. She delegates her choice to a committee of experts who assess the costs of those errors differently. For example, the committee may not find it so costly to hire a bad economist, or conversely, the committee may be less willing to expand the department.
A common practice is for committee members to communicate to each other, perhaps through a straw poll, to aggregate their information before voting and then to present a "united front" to the Dean. These straw polls may be difficult to prevent, but one might envision that a Dean might take steps to limit these private communications. For example, she may insist that she (or a representative of hers) attend all committee discussions.
Our paper studies the degree to which the Dean should try to prevent committee deliberations when there is a conflict of interest between her and the committee. We believe that conflicts of this form arise generally, where a Principal delegates a choice to a committee of experts whose preferences differ from her own. The prior literature, particularly Coughlan (2000) and Gerardi and Yariv (2007) , has emphasized how the possibility for communication has an important effect on voting outcomes. This paper poses the following question: even if the Principal could ban communication and straw polls, would she benefit from doing so?
We pose this question in a standard information aggregation framework. There is an unknown state of the world, and agents appointed to a committee obtain signals of that state. Each committee member makes a binary recommendation that is aggregated by a voting rule that selects a binary action, i.e. whether to hire a job candidate. The Principal and the committee members have completely aligned preferences when the state is known, but ex interim there is imperfect information and signal profiles exist at which the Principal and committee members prefer different actions. All committee members are likeminded.
The Principal can choose the committee's size, the voting rule, and whether to permit committee members to deliberate-e.g., take a straw poll or secretly communicate-before they vote. Straw polls or secret communications between committee members permit the committee to perfectly coordinate their recommendations based on the joint signal profile and implement their (ex interim) preferred outcome. This is a form of collusion that arises in a one-shot setting when committee members can communicate. In contrast, banning deliberation prevents the committee from colluding in this manner. Nevertheless, committee members may still tacitly collude by playing their favorite equilibrium in the voting game without communication. Our main result speaks to whether the Principal gains from banning deliberation given this possibility for tacit collusion. We prove the following result:
Proposition. If a committee adopts its most preferred equilibrium, the highest payoff that the Principal achieves from banning deliberation is no more than her payoff from permitting deliberation.
Here is the logic of our result: generically, in a setting without communication, the committeeoptimal equilibrium is in pure strategies. These pure strategies involve some voters fully revealing their signals with their votes and others voting completely uninformatively (i.e. independent of their signals). The voting outcome is then isomorphic to an election in which the uninformative voters are completely absent. Optimizing the committee size and threshold voting rule with this issue in mind leads a Principal to choose a committee design where all voters are voting informatively. Such a committee implements the same outcome as it would if it could have a (truthful) straw poll. Therefore, once a Principal faces the possibility of tacit collusion, she may as well allow committee members to communicate freely. By contrast, were committee members to always play the Principal's favorite equilibrium, she gains from banning deliberation.
We show through examples in Section 4 that the restriction to threshold voting rules is needed for this result. Once the Principal can choose voting rules that are non-monotone or non-anonymous, then she gains from banning deliberation even if the committee chooses its favored equilibrium in the game without deliberation. Tacit collusion offers a reason as to why a Principal may wish to use a non-threshold voting rule.
We view this result as one rationale for the prevalence of practices that allow committee members to secretly communicate or take straw polls prior to voting. In certain instances (e.g., a jury), one may view the Principal as sharing committee members' preferences, and so the use of deliberative practices appears natural. But in other cases where there is a clear conflict of interest, such as that of hiring and budgetary decisions, it may be puzzling as to why we see an absence of measures that impede committee members from secretly communicating with each other. One response is that perhaps it is technologically costly to prohibit communication; another is that perhaps the binary voting environment coarsely filters the potentially rich information of experts, and so communication is needed. To isolate a new tension -namely, that the Principal cannot choose the equilibrium that is played -we preclude both of these rationales. We assume that it is technologically feasible to prohibit deliberation and that voters obtain identically distributed binary signals, so that there is no need for a finer communication language. Our result suggests that this new tension provides an additional reason for allowing communication: if committee members can tacitly collude, the Principal does not gain from banning deliberation.
Related Literature: The tension that we study-namely, that even if a designer is involved in designing the rules of the game, she may be unable to force agents to play her preferred equilibrium of that game-has been posed broadly in mechanism and organizational design (Laffont and Martimort, 2000; Mookherjee, 2006) . In a mechanism, agents may collude both in reports made to a Principal and in participation decisions. In our context, "overt collusion" corresponds to deliberation, where committee members share all information with each other before sending reports to the Principal. By contrast, "tacit collusion" corresponds to committee members being unable to share information with each other, but being able to coordinate their play on their most preferred equilibrium. 1 We identify an equivalence from the Principal's perspective: after designing the committee optimally, she is affected identically by both forms of collusion.
We build on studies of committee decision-making with common interests, particularly McLennan (1998) . Our focus is on the best equilibrium (from the committee's standpoint) with and without communication, and with such behavior in mind, how the Principal forms a committee and selects a voting rule. Our message complements that of Coughlan (2000) and Gerardi and Yariv (2007) given the potential for disagreements within the committee. In such cases, deliberation may not be so costly to the Principal. By contrast, we show that even if committee members share perfectly aligned preferences, the Principal does not gain from banning deliberation.
Our paper also connects to work on communication with multiple senders. The study of cheap talk with multiple senders (Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1987; Krishna and Morgan, 2001; Battaglini, 2002) focuses on how the conflict of preferences within a committee of experts can be useful to elicit information. By contrast, we study the conflict between a Principal and a committee of like-minded experts where the Principal has already committed to a voting rule. A series of papers study a setting similar to ours but focus on behavior when the Principal cannot commit to a voting rule, and hence, messages are payoff-irrelevant; see Wolinsky (2002), Morgan and Stocken (2008) , Battaglini (2016) , and Gradwohl and Feddersen (2018) . In these papers, truthful communication is impeded by each agent anticipating that her report matters only on the margin for the Principal, and given the conflict of interest, agents are unwilling to report truthfully on that margin. Battaglini (2016) illustrates how allowing individuals to share communication-i.e., overtly collude-using social media can facilitate information aggregation and make both the agents and the Principal better off. Gradwohl and Feddersen (2018) 
Model

Environment
Payoffs. A Principal faces a binary choice with uncertain payoffs, and delegates that choice to a committee of experts. The quality of that alternative is either low, ω = L, or high, ω = H.
All players share a common prior that attributes probability π ∈ (0, 1) to high quality.
The Principal and committee share the same ordinal preferences under certainty, in that they both prefer to accept high quality alternatives and reject low quality alternatives, but they differ in the intensity of their preferences. All players receive a payoff of zero from accepting a high quality alternative or rejecting a low quality alternative. The Principal's payoff from accepting a low quality alternative is −q P and her payoff from rejecting a high quality alternative is −(1 − q P ). The analogous payoffs for a committee member are −q C and −(1 − q C ), respectively. 3 We assume that 1 > q P > q C > 0. Because the Principal is worse off from accepting the low quality alternative, for every interior belief about the quality of the alternative, the committee is more willing to accept than the Principal.
Low
High Reject 0, 0 Committee Design. If chosen to be on the committee, expert i obtains private information s i ∈ {l, h} about the quality of the alternative, where γ l = Pr(s i = l|L) and γ h = Pr(s i = h|H) denote the precision of his signal in each state. Without loss of generality, we assume that γ l ≥ 1/2 and γ h ≥ 1/2. No signal is perfectly informative (γ l < 1 and γ h < 1) and conditional on ω, signals are independent across experts. Let N be the number of available experts, which we assume to be finite. The Principal chooses a committee size C ≤ N . Let C denote the set of committee members and s ≡ (s i ) i∈C denote the committee signal profile.
Each committee member i simultaneously votes to accept or reject, v i ∈ {A, R}. Denote the committee voting profile by v ≡ (v i ) i∈C . The Principal commits to a voting rule f : {A, R} C → {0, 1} to aggregate votes, where an alternative is accepted if f (·) = 1 and otherwise is rejected.
We refer to (f, C) as the committee design. A voting rule f is monotone if f (A, v −i ) = 1 whenever
. We refer to monotone and anonymous voting rules as threshold rules, given that each such rule is equivalent to accepting the alternative whenever the number of accept votes exceeds some threshold k in {0, ..., C + 1}. Let F C be the set of allowable voting rules for a committee of size C, and let F ≡ {F C } C≤N denote this set for each feasible committee size. We take F to be a primitive of our model and assume that F C is a subset of the set of non-constant voting rules for each C ≤ N . The allowable set of voting rules may contain additional restrictions such as, for example, a restriction to threshold rules.
No Deliberation. Suppose that the committee cannot share private information in any way before voting. In other words, there is no deliberation. A strategy for committee member i is a mapping σ i : {l, h} → ∆{A, R} from his private signal to (a distribution over) his vote.
To simplify notation, let σ i (s i ) denote the probability with which he votes to accept following signal s i . Following the literature, we say that committee member i votes fully informatively if
Fixing a committee C of size C, let σ ≡ (σ i ) i∈C denote a strategy profile and Σ C denote the set of strategy profiles. Since committee members share common interests, they each earn an identical ex ante expected payoff W (σ; f, C) from strategy profile σ when the Principal uses design (f, C). Let Σ * (f, C) denote the set of equilibrium strategy profiles for design (f, C) in the game without deliberation.
Definition 1. A committee tacitly colludes if it plays an equilibrium in the game without deliberation that maximizes the committee's payoff, σ * ∈ arg max σ∈Σ * (f,C) W (σ; f, C).
Tacit collusion corresponds to the committee behaving in a way that is committee-optimal (among equilibria). If the committee has multiple optimal equilibria, we assume that it resolves indifference in favor of an equilibrium that is optimal for the Principal. Let Σ * T (f, C) denote the set of tacit collusive equilibria.
The Principal earns ex ante expected payoff V (σ; f, C) from strategy profile σ when she chooses design (f, C). Therefore, when the committee engages in tacit collusion, the Principal's expected payoff is
. Given a set of allowable voting rules F, the best payoff that the Principal can achieve in any committee design under tacit collusion is
(1)
Deliberation. Suppose the committee can freely communicate their private information with each other before voting, in other words, deliberate. One may envision a range of communication protocols, but given the simplicity of the environment that we consider, it suffices to study the following simple protocol. Suppose that, as in a straw poll, each committee member simultaneously sends the message h or l. Messages are publicly observed by all members of the committee, but not the Principal. Based on these messages, committee members vote on whether to accept the alternative. In this game, we define overt collusion as follows.
Definition 2. A committee engages in overt collusion if it selects its most preferred equilibrium in the game with deliberation.
Let V O (f, C) be the Principal's expected payoff from using design (f, C) when the committee engages in overt collusion. Given a set of allowable voting rules F, the best payoff that the Principal can achieve in any committee design is
Discussion of Model
We make a number of assumptions to simplify and sharpen the analysis in this stylized model of deliberation and voting. Importantly, committee members share pure common values, and information is binary. We view the pure common values environment as being appropriate to elucidate whether a Principal may wish to allow deliberation, even if all committee members truthfully reveal information to each other and unanimously agree on a decision after doing so. If committee members had different preferences from each other, they might not truthfully reveal information to each other (Austen-Smith and Feddersen, 2006; Gerardi and Yariv, 2007) , and thus be less able to collude even with communication. 4 We restrict attention to identically distributed binary signals to isolate the effect of tacit
collusion. An important complementary motive for permitting deliberation is that the binary action of voting may be too coarse to appropriately reflect the richness of voters' information.
In a model with a richer or heterogeneous information structure, the power of tacit collusion would then be confounded with the gains from allowing a more expressive language through deliberation. To isolate the particular force that we study and obviate this orthogonal motive for deliberation, we assume that the action space of voting is as rich as the information space.
3 Banning Deliberation: An Irrelevance Result
Some Preliminary Results
Before proceeding to our main result, we prove some preliminary results about overt and tacit collusion. These results are used both in our main result and the examples in Section 4.
Overt Collusion: Let us turn first to the case of overt collusion. The committee faces a common interest game and so the committee-optimal strategy is to truthfully reveal private information and then vote unanimously for the committee-preferred action given this information.
In other words, for any committee design (f, C), the committee plays a voting profile v such that f (v) = 1 if and only if, given signal profile s, P (ω = H|s) ≥ q C . The outcome, and therefore, the Principal's value from overt collusion, is the same for all (non-constant) voting rules.
Lemma 0. For every committee size C,
We omit a formal proof, given the logic exposited in the preceding discussion.
Tacit Collusion: Our novel results are in the characterization of tacit collusion. Lemma 1 establishes that there exists a committee-optimal pure strategy equilibrium for any committee design. Moreover, for generic parameters, such an equilibrium is unique within the class of all strategy profiles (up to a re-ordering of player labels). Lemma 2 shows that once the committee is selecting its preferred equilibrium, it is without loss for the Principal to restrict attention to committee designs in which fully informative voting is the committee-optimal equilibrium. 5
Both of these results apply to any set of allowable voting rules F C .
Lemma 1. For any committee design (f, C), there exists a committee-optimal equilibrium that is in pure strategies. Generically, in every committee-optimal equilibrium, all members who are pivotal with positive probability play a pure strategy.
Proof. Given a committee (f, C), a strategy profile σ is committee-optimal if W (σ; f, C) ≥
for each i. McLennan (1998) establishes that every committee-optimal strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium.
First we show that there exists a committee-optimal strategy profile in pure strategies.
Suppose that there is a committee-optimal strategy profile σ in which member i follows a strictly mixed strategy. We construct a pure strategy profile that achieves the same payoff. Let us denote the four different pure strategies for member i:σ AA is the strategy that involves voting to accept regardless of signal;σ AR is the strategy of informative voting;σ RA is the strategy of inverted voting, σ i (h) = 0 and σ i (l) = 1; andσ RR is the strategy that involves voting to reject regardless of signal. If member i is playing a mixed strategy, then he is randomizing between at least two of these pure strategies,σ andσ ′ . For member i to be willing to randomize, it must be that
But then the strategy (σ, σ −i ) is also committee-optimal.
Iterating through each committee member who randomizes results in a pure strategy profileσ that is payoff-equivalent to σ, and therefore also a committee-optimal strategy profile. But theñ σ is also an equilibrium strategy profile, and therefore there also exists a committee-optimal strategy profile in which all members follow a pure strategy.
We establish the second statement of Lemma 1 in Online Appendix A.
Lemma 2. Generically, for any committee design (f, C), there exists a committee design (f ′ , C ′ )
with C ′ ≤ C in which the committee-optimal equilibrium is for all committee members to vote informatively and all committee members are pivotal with positive probability, such that
Proof. Fixing committee design (f, C), by Lemma 1, there exists a committee-optimal strategy profile in pure strategies. Let σ * denote this strategy profile. Recall that this implies that σ * is a committee-optimal equilibrium for (f, C). This strategy yields ex ante expected payoff W (σ * ; f, C) to the committee and V T (f, C) to the Principal. In a pure strategy profile, a committee member either (i) always votes to accept; (ii) always votes to reject or (iii) votes informatively or inverted. When the committee plays σ * , let I ⊂ C denote the subset of committee members who vote informatively or inverted and are pivotal with positive probability, and let U ≡ C \ I denote the set of voters who always accept, always reject or are not pivotal with positive probability. For any subset of committee members C ′ ⊂ C and strategy profile σ, let σ C ′ ≡ (σ i ) i∈C ′ denote the strategy profile and v C ′ ≡ (v i ) i∈C ′ denote the voting profile for members in C ′ .
First, we show that when some committee members who play σ * vote uninformatively or are pivotal with probability zero, there exists a design and a strategy profile in which no members vote uninformatively and all members are pivotal with positive probability that yields an equivalent expected payoff to the Principal and the committee as design (f, C) and strategy σ * . Define a voting rule f ′′ : {A, R} |I| → {0, 1} such that f ′′ implements the same outcome as voting rule f for any vote profile v I played by informative and inverted voters who are pivotal with posi-tive probability, given uninformative and non-pivotal voters select vote profile v U corresponding to uninformative voters' constant strategy in σ * and an arbitrary vote profile for non-pivotal voters. In other words,
and strategy profile σ * I yield an equivalent payoff to the Principal and the committee as design (f, C) and strategy profile σ * , V (σ * I ; f ′′ , |I|) = V (σ * ; f, C) and W (σ * I ; f ′′ , |I|) = W (σ * ; f, C). Next, we show that σ * I is a committee-optimal strategy profile for design (f ′′ , |I|). Suppose there exists a σ ′ I ∈ Σ |I| such that W (σ ′ I ; f ′′ , |I|) > W (σ * I ; f ′′ , |I|). The set of vote profiles that occur with positive probability under σ ′ I is a subset of the set of vote profiles that occur with positive probability under σ * I , since all feasible vote profiles v I ∈ {A, R} |I| occur with positive probability under σ * I . By extension, this same relationship holds for strategy profiles σ ′ = (σ ′ I , σ * U ) and σ * . Therefore, strategy profile σ ′ yields payoff W (σ ′ ; f, C) = W (σ ′ I ; f ′′ , |I|), since by definition f ′′ implements the same outcome as f on all vote profiles that occur with positive probability under σ * . This implies W (σ ′ ; f, C) > W (σ * I ; f ′′ , |I|) = W (σ * ; f, C), which is a contradiction since σ * is a committee-optimal strategy profile for design (f, C). Therefore, σ * I is a committee-optimal strategy profile for design (f ′′ , |I|). This implies that it is also a committee-optimal equilibrium for (f ′′ , |I|).
By definition, design (f, C) and strategy σ * results in the same outcome as design (f ′′ , |I|) and strategy σ * I for any realized profile of private signals. Therefore, when the committee plays a committee-optimal equilibrium, the Principal's value of committee design (f, C) is equal to the value of design (f ′′ , |I|).
Finally, we show that if some committee members vote inverted in strategy profile σ * I under design (f ′′ , |I|), there exists a design of equivalent value to the Principal in which all members vote informatively in the committee-optimal strategy profile. Given design (f ′′ , |I|) and strategy profile σ * I , let J ⊂ I be the set of members who play the inverted voting strategy and let α i = {v −i |f (A, v −i ) ∕ = f (R, v −i )} be the set of voting profiles at which member i is pivotal.
Member i is willing to play the inverted voting strategy if he prefers to reject when he observes a high signal,
and he prefers to accept when he observes a low signal,
where µ(s, v −i ) the posterior belief that the state is H at action profile v −i when other players play strategy σ * I and member i observes signal s, and P (v −i |s) is the probability that member i believes that other players play v −i when he observes signal s. Define a voting rule f ′ :
. In other words, at the action profiles at which inverted voters are pivotal, invert the voting rule. Then under f ′ , member i is willing to play an informative voting strategy, as this reverses the inequalities in the above incentive constraints. For any signal profile s, the same decision is taken under f ′ and f ′′ . Therefore, changing f ′′ does not interfere with the incentives of other members and the Principal's value of committee design (f ′ , |I|) is equal to the value of design (f ′′ , |I|). In design (f ′ , |I|), all committee members vote informatively in the committee-optimal equilibrium.
To prove the final statement, suppose that f is a threshold rule in which an alternative is accepted if at least k committee members vote to accept. Under a threshold rule, conditional on being pivotal, the payoff from accepting with a positive signal is higher than that from accepting with a negative signal and the payoff from rejecting with a negative signal is higher than the payoff from rejecting with a positive signal, regardless of the behavior of others. Hence, there is no equilibrium strategy profile in which a committee member is pivotal with positive probability and adopts an inverted voting strategy. Therefore, given committee-optimal strategy σ * , σ * I involves all committee members voting informatively. It remains to show that when f is a threshold rule, then voting rule f ′′ constructed above is also a threshold rule. Let U A ⊂ U denote the set of committee members who vote to always accept when playing σ * . Then the threshold rule in which an alternative is accepted if at least k ′′ ≡ max{0, k − |U A |} out of |I| members vote to accept will implement the same outcome as threshold rule f in a committee of size C. Therefore, f ′′ is a threshold rule with cut-off k ′′ . From here, the outlined above established that (f ′′ , |I|) and strategy profile σ * I yield an equivalent payoff to the Principal as (f, C) and σ * , and that σ * I is a committee-optimal equilibrium for (f ′′ , |I|). Given that we do not need to consider inverted voting for threshold rules, f ′ = f ′′ .
The Main Result
The Principal's design problem involves choosing whether to delegate to a committee, a design (f, C), and whether to allow the committee to deliberate, for example, in the form of a straw poll. We study how the Principal makes these choices when she anticipates that if deliberation is banned, then the committee will tacitly collude and play its preferred equilibrium. Proposition 1. If the Principal must use a threshold voting rule, then she does not gain from banning deliberation: V * T (F) = V * O (F) when F is the set of threshold voting rules.
Our result offers a strategic rationale for the ubiquity of deliberation. Whenever the Principal uses a threshold voting rule-i.e. an anonymous and monotone rule-then she may as well permit committee members to take a straw poll.
In Section 4, we show that the conditions for our results are tight. Namely, once the Principal can use a voting rule that is either non-monotone or non-anonymous, she can gain from banning deliberation. This result indicates a new and different rationale for non-standard voting rules:
namely, if a committee tacitly colludes, a non-monotone or non-anonymous rule may allow the Principal to sway the committee, despite its conflict of interest. Alternatively, if she can recommend the equilibrium that is played by the committee in the game without deliberation, then she can also sway the committee. In this case, she once again gains from banning deliberation.
The remainder of this section proves Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose F is the set of threshold voting rules. By Lemma 1, for any threshold rule, there exists a committee-optimal pure strategy equilibrium. If the committee selects its preferred equilibrium, by Lemma 2, it is without loss for the Principal to restrict attention to threshold rules in which fully informative voting is a committee-optimal equilibrium.
Therefore, under tacit collusion, there exists a committee-design (f * , C * ) that is optimal within the set of threshold voting rules and induces fully informative voting.
Let (f, C) be a committee design in which f is a threshold rule and there exists a committeeoptimal equilibrium in which all committee members vote fully informatively under tacit collusion. Lemma 2 of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) establishes that informative voting is an equilibrium if and only if the threshold rule is statistically optimal for the committee.
Therefore, the decisions reached in design (f, C) are identical under tacit and overt collusion,
Moreover, it also follows from Lemma 2 of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) that for every committee C and voting rule f , there exists a threshold voting rule f ′ such that V O (f, C) = V T (f ′ , C), and so
. Therefore, the two are equal.
When There are Gains from Banning Deliberation
In this section, we describe scenarios where banning deliberation benefits the Principal. We show that either if Principal selects the equilibrium when she must use a threshold rule, if the set of allowable voting rules is not restricted to threshold rules, or if the committee selects the equilibrium but the committee size is fixed, then there are gains from banning deliberation.
To illustrate these possibilities, consider a setting with three available committee members.
Suppose that the prior is uniform, π = 1/2, and that the signal precision is symmetric across states, γ l = γ h = γ. Moreover, suppose that the payoff parameters are such that the committee strictly prefers to accept any alternative with at least two out of three favorable signals and strictly prefers to reject any alternative with zero or one favorable signals. In contrast, the Principal strictly prefers to accept only those alternatives with three favorable signals and strictly prefers to reject alternatives with two or fewer favorable signals. 6 No Collusion. We first illustrate how the Principal gains from banning deliberation when she can select the equilibrium played by the committee, even if she is restricted to threshold voting rules. In this example, she chooses a mixed strategy equilibrium for the committee, which
gives each committee member a strictly lower payoff than the committee-optimal pure strategy equilibrium.
Consider a committee design (f * , 3) in which the Principal selects all three committee members and chooses a threshold rule f * that accepts an alternative if it receives three accept votes, and otherwise rejects. Informative voting is not an equilibrium under design (f * , 3) because accepting an alternative if it receives at least two accept votes is the unique threshold rule that induces fully informative voting under the parametric assumptions outlined above. We show that a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium under design (f * , 3), in which committee members vote to accept following a favorable signal and randomize between accept and reject following an unfavorable signal, yields a higher payoff for the Principal that she attains under overt or tacit collusion with any threshold rule and for any feasible committee size.
Before delving into the calculations, we describe why the Principal benefits from banning deliberation when she can recommend an equilibrium for the committee. In the mixed strategy equilibrium described above, the Principal sways the committee towards rejecting the alternative with positive probability when only two players receive favorable signals, as the player who receives an unfavorable signal mixes and rejects with positive probability. The Principal indeed prefers to reject such an alternative, while the committee prefers to accept it (and would do so if it could deliberate under rule f * ). The Principal also sways the committee towards accepting with positive probability when the committee receives zero or one favorable signals, as any player who receives an unfavorable signal accepts with positive probability. Both the Principal and the committee prefer to reject such alternatives. We show that under parametric restrictions, the Principal's gain from the higher probability of rejecting an alternative with two favorable signals is greater than her loss from the higher probability of accepting an alternative with zero or one favorable signals, and therefore, the mixed strategy equilibrium yields a higher payoff than overt collusion in design (f * , 3). We also show that under parametric restrictions, alternative designs yield strictly lower payoffs to the Principal due to the informational loss from the smaller committee size. Figure 2 graphs the Principal's expected payoff and illustrates how she gains from the no-collusion mixed strategy equilibrium in the game without deliberation, relative to overt collusion in two-or three-person committees. In the game without deliberation, consider the mixed strategy profile in which each committee member votes to accept following s i = h and votes to accept with probability p following
Committee member i is pivotal when the other two committee members vote to accept.
He is indifferent between accepting and rejecting, conditioning on being pivotal and observing
The solution to (3) characterizes the unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium of the form described above. 7 Moreover, for an open set of parameters, it is also the Principal's preferred equilibrium. 8 Therefore, if there are at most three committee members and the Principal can select the equilibrium, she benefits from banning deliberation.
Non-Anonymous Monotone Rule. Next, we illustrate how the Principal gains from banning deliberation if the voting rule can be non-anonymous (but still must be monotone) and the committee can tacitly collude; an analogous example can be used to illustrate the same effect if the voting rule can be non-monotone (even if it must be anonymous). Return to the threemember committee introduced above and suppose that the committee can coordinate to select its preferred equilibrium. Additionally, suppose that the committee members' payoff parame-ter is such that the committee prefers to accept the alternative based solely on the prior (i.e. q C < 1/2). Consider the monotone and non-anonymous voting rule described in Figure 3 . This voting rule involves player 1 having the ability to veto acceptance: if she votes to reject, then the alternative is rejected. If she votes to accept, then at least one of players 2 and 3 have to vote in favor for the alternative to be accepted.
illustrating the lack of anonymity. This voting rule is monotone: switching any player's vote from rejection to acceptance, holding all other votes fixed, cannot switch the chosen action from acceptance to rejection. We describe the logic for why the Principal benefits from banning deliberation with this rule.
The Principal sways the committee towards rejecting the alternative when player 1 obtains an unfavorable signal and players 2 and 3 each receive favorable signals. With deliberation, the committee would prefer to accept such an alternative. But without deliberation, f makes player 1 pivotal both in the cases where only one of players 2 and 3 are voting to accept and the case where both of them are doing so. Under parametric restrictions, pooling these three vote profiles maintains player 1's incentive to vote informatively, rather than switching to voting uninformatively in favor of the alternative. This leads the committee to reject the alternative when player 1 receives an unfavorable signal, even when players 2 and 3 receive favorable signals.
We formalize this logic below. If informative voting is a committee-optimal equilibrium under f , then the outcome induced by tacit collusion is identical to that induced by overt collusion for all signal profiles except (l, h, h). For this signal profile, tacit collusion leads to the alternative being rejected but overt collusion leads to the alternative being selected. Since the Principal prefers for the alternative to be rejected in this case, choosing rule f and banning deliberation yields a higher payoff than that under overt collusion with rule f .
Thus, it suffices to show that informative voting is a committee-optimal equilibrium of the game with voting rule f and no deliberation. We first show that there exist parameter values such that informative voting is an equilibrium strategy profile under f . When other members are voting informatively, it is straightforward to see that each of members 2 and 3 has a strict incentive to vote informatively conditioning on being pivotal, since in both cases member 1 is voting A and the other member must be voting R. Consider member 1. He is pivotal when at least one of members 2 and 3 is voting in favor of the alternative. While he does not have an incentive to vote informatively when both members 2 and 3 vote in favor of the alternative, for generic parameter values of γ and q C , it is still strictly optimal for member 1 to vote informatively when averaging across all voting profiles at which he is pivotal. 9 Therefore, informative voting an equilibrium under f .
We next determine whether informative voting is also the committee-optimal equilibrium under f . Given Lemma 1, it suffices to compare informative voting to each pure strategy equilibrium. Under our parametric restrictions, the informative voting profile does indeed yield a higher expected payoff for the committee than any other pure strategy equilibrium. We omit these straightforward calculations.
The above reasoning establishes that the Principal is better off banning deliberation when there are three committee members, as the equilibrium that the committee selects under design (f, 3) yields a higher payoff for the Principal than any three-person committee with overt collusion. Moreover, her payoff from tacit collusion given a three-member committee is better than her payoff from overt collusion in a one or two-member committee, and under certain parametric restrictions, is better than rejecting all alternatives. 10 Therefore, if there are at most three committee members and the Principal can use a non-anonymous voting rule, she benefits from banning deliberation.
Fixed Committee Size. Finally, suppose that the committee size is exogenously fixed at three members and the committee selects its preferred equilibrium. We show that in this case, it is optimal for the Principal to ban deliberation and select a voting rule that accepts the alternative if and only if all three committee members vote to accept. The committee selects an asymmetric equilibrium in which one committee member votes to accept regardless of his signal, and the remaining two members vote informatively. Each committee member receives a strictly lower payoff than under overt collusion, while the Principal receives a strictly higher payoff. This example illustrates how the Principal may prefer to ban deliberation if institutional precedent or legal agreements specify that the committee size cannot be altered; the contrast with our main result is that if the Principal can also vary the committee size, then she achieves no gains from banning deliberation.
The logic is that when the Principal is restricted in her choice of committee size, the asymmetric equilibrium described above sways the committee towards rejecting with positive probability when only two players receive favorable signals. If one of the members who votes informatively receives the sole unfavorable signal, the alternative is rejected, while if the member who votes uninformatively receives the sole unfavorable signal, the alternative is accepted. Therefore, the alternative is rejected for two out of the three possible signal profiles with one unfavorable signal.
This contrasts with the decision under overt collusion, in which the alternative is accepted for all three signal profiles with one unfavorable signal. Because the decisions on other signal profiles are the same under this asymmetric equilibrium and overt collusion, she prefers the asymmetric equilibrium in the game without overt collusion.
Note that her expected payoff from this asymmetric equilibrium equals her expected payoff from overt collusion in a two-member committee. Therefore, the blue line in Figure 2 is equal to her expected payoff in the asymmetric equilibrium. As can be seen in the figure, under the assumption that q C < γ, where γ is set to 0.7, the Principal prefers the asymmetric equilibrium (in the game without deliberation) to overt collusion in a three-person committee. 11
Conclusion
Many organizations, firms, and legislatures rely on committees to evaluate proposals. It is often the case that the preferences of those who serve on these committees conflict with those of the Principal who appoints the committee. A ubiquitous feature of committee-design is that committees are given opportunities to secretly deliberate, communicate, and coordinate prior to voting. Many committees draw straw polls (which aren't reported to the Principal) before coordinating on a voting decision. This feature may appear puzzling insofar as the Principal may be hurt by allowing the committee to have this informational superiority.
One rationale for this procedure is technological: it may simply be too costly to ban deliberation, and so this is an unavoidable feature of institutional design. Our analysis suggests a different, strategic rationale for the prevalence of deliberative practices: if the Principal anticipates that the committee tacitly colludes on a committee-optimal equilibrium if she bans deliberation, then she finds no reason to do so. In other words, she shouldn't ban straw polls, even if she can.
